Numerous authors from various disciplines have underlined the importance of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Conserved Territories and Areas (ICCAs) for assuring the livelihoods of local populations whilst conserving the environment. The agdal is probably Morocco's best example of such an institution. Nevertheless they have always existed within the context of change and currently are experiencing major transitions. Detailed ethnographic studies of the socio-ecological drivers of these processes of change in agdals are scarce. Based on the particular case of the agdal of Yagur in the Mountain Mesioui tribal territory (High Atlas of Morocco), this article will analyse contemporary transformations. These dynamics are inherent to small-scale societies' ICCAs, even if they have most often been described as isolated, autarchic and mutable only under external pressure. From the case of the agdal of Yagur, we show how non-local processes are only part of the picture, and that the transformation of agdal forms are also related to key internal drivers, entailing a greater degree of agency by local actors than is usually given in the literature. At the same time, placing our analysis within a broader social anthropological framing, we provide a detailed actor-centred analysis that situates agents and local power relations within their institutional and cultural context while explaining how these same micropolitics of natural resource management articulate with and within wider global scales.
Introduction
By the 1950s common property regimes and the communal management of natural resources, often referred to as the commons, was already being challenged by numerous scholars (Alchian, 1950; Demsetz, 1967 ). Yet it was Hardin's 'Tragedy of the commons' in particular (1968) that had the most impact, serving to justify strong top-down state management and privatisation. Much empirical and theoretical work has been done in recent decades to rectify this erroneous and damaging assumption (McCay and Acheson, 1987) . As shown by others since, Hardin's assumption was based on the mistaken conflation of common-property with free open-access (Berkes et al., 1989) . As Ostrom has demonstrated (1990, p. 65) , common-property can encourage relatively egalitarian access to natural resources while assuring their sustainable governance and use.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, further discussions took place within the World Commission on Protected Areas (www.iucn.org/ WCPA) of the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) on the need for looking at Community Conserved Areas (CCAs) as a new approach to protected areas within the IUCN's Protected Area categorisation system. Around the same time WCPA brought a strong focus on CCAs at the 5th World Parks Congress held in 2003. The Congress issued 32 recommendations related to protected areas, including several regarding CCAs. Recommendation V.26 recognized that a considerable part of Earth's biodiversity survives in CCAs, and called for their recognition and promotion as a legitimate form of biodiversity conservation. Since these initial years, the IUCN has reiterated and nuanced its recognition and support of CCAs (Kothari et al., 2012: 34) which later became ICCAs (Indigenous peoples and local Communities Conserved Areas and territories).
Today the IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) and the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) encourage all countries to recognize and provide support for ICCAs, due to their importance for sound management of biodiversity and ecosystem services, minimizing environmental hazards, and mitigating climate change. This relatively new formulation of ICCAs, whose usage has increased over the last decade with the creation of the ICCA Consortium (http://www.iccaconsortium.org), includes a greater degree of identity, territoriality and heritage to the more general notion of the commons or CCAs. In fact, ICCAs typically concern indigenous peoples and local communities with important cultural and historical roots, often rather isolated and small, thus requiring special considerations that differentiates them from the management of other types of commons that may not have such attributes (e. g. the oceans or the atmosphere, neo-rural cooperatives, creative commons organizations, new urban collective orchards, the internet, etc.).
In this context, Borrini-Feyerabend (2010) asserts that ICCAs are central to community empowerment, livelihoods and socioecological resilience as well as ensuring the well-being of millions of people and the conservation of about one third of the global ecosystems (terrestrial and aquatic), and Corrigan and Granziera (2010) have highlighted the need to integrate ICCAs within comprehensive strategies for sustainable development. ICCAs should not, however, be regarded either as a universal panacea for conservation or development, for there are many cases where existing ICCAs have ended up transforming to unsuccessful forms of management (Ruiz-Mallen and Corbera, 2013) . In explaining the failing drift of such ICCAs, authors have often pointed to 'external' forces (e. g. colonisation, postcolonisation, cultural globalization, global market expansion, etc.) as the main source of this problem (Auclair and AlIfriqui, 2005, p. 71; Beyene, 2010, p. 485; Chuluun and Ojima, 2011, p. 368; Benmoussa, 2013; Haller et al., 2013, p. 4) . Nevertheless, little scholarly work has been done to understand how the internal dynamic webs of power relationships play out and are navigated within ICCAs by actors that are embedded within the tensions between pre-existing local sociocultural structures and collective agencies.
The agdal system is Morocco's primary traditional form of Berber (Amazigh) ICCA which as Gellner (1969) and Ilahiane (1999) have described have been well established in the High Atlas Mountains for several centuries at least. In fact, an even earlier origination (potentially millenary) may be established through the linguistic analysis of the agdal term (Auclair and AlIfriqui, 2005) , especially when considering the extensive use of the root gdl, which ranges 2000 km in the four cardinal directions; from Tunisia to the Moroccan Atlantic coasts of Essaouira and from the North of Algeria to the Ahaggar in the southern Sahara.
In agronomic terms the agdal can be defined as a collectively agreed prohibition on the extraction of a given (generally vegetative) natural resource within a delimited space, during a certain time frame. The aims of the agdal are: 1. maximizing annual production, and assuring the reproductive cycle of certain favoured plants, and hence, the continuity of the extractive activity; and 2. relatively equal access to natural resources through collective decision-making, as all users have same rights to the common pool. Hence, the agdal can be conceived as a collective agreement, reached through the tribal council or assembly (JMAA) comprising all male household heads in a given community, to seasonally restrict access to a given natural resource. But beyond being an agro-economic management tool, the agdal is also a cultural institution with deep historical roots around which pivots a whole system of religious and symbolic referents through which we may view mountain Berber culture and thus constitutes a "total social fact" as defined by Mauss (2002, p. 100 ).
There are many approaches within general social science that have endeavoured to solve the tension between structure and agency within social change, as for example Parssons (1949) , Habermas (1991) and Giddens (1984) . Nevertheless, perhaps Bourdieu has made the most advanced proposals in overcoming this tension through his concept of the 'habitus ' (1980) . Social transformations that have occurred in marginal socio-ecosystems such as the agdals may be understood through the habitus framework, as we discuss later. The replication of nature-culture relations inherent to agdals may be indeed viewed through the reproduction of the habitus; not in fixed sense, but a dynamic one as defined by this author.
Agdals and other types of similar institutions elsewhere in small-scale societies and marginal human-ecosystems, have generally been regarded as rather conservative (Berque, 1978) in the sense that they tend to reproduce themselves, despite historical dynamic interactions with the wider world (Wolf, 1972; Netting, 2008) . We argue, by contrast, that the collective habitus of these societies, structural and agential, has in fact been continuously reformulated through such interactions, in both explicit and implicit ways, through innovative paths to readdress the constant socio-ecological imbalances generated by the ever changing moment, be they political or environmental in origin (GomezBaggethun and Reyes-Garcia, 2013) .
Even though the agdal system has long been in contact with wider regional influences, its presence is still widespread across North-West Africa, as can be counted in over a hundred thousand of examples concerning a myriad of natural resources such as algae, cereals, pastures, tree leaves, fruit trees, wood trees and water. Nevertheless, overall this cultural form of governance has become increasingly weak over the last century, as is occurring with other ICCAs under threat worldwide (Borrini-Feyerabend, 2010, pp. 8e9) . Detailed ethnographic studies on these processes are still lacking. Dominguez has undertaken intensive field investigations over the last decade (Dominguez, 2010) , particularly among the Mesioua Berber community of the High Atlas of Marrakesh, Morocco, who manage the Yagur territory by means of the agdal institution.
The aims of the case of the Mesioui agdals presented here are:
1. To contribute to general conceptual understandings of the problematic nature-culture dynamics inherent to small-scale societies within ICCAs. 2 To challenge the idea that the agdals have been isolated and autarchic systems, mutable mainly only under the influence of external forces. In contrast to this perspective, the present paper will argue that this is a partial view and that in reality the transformation of agdals is the result of both 'external' and important 'internal' factors, by presenting a view of local actors that concedes them a greater degree of agency than is usually given in the literature referring to such transformational processes. 3. To contribute to a broader socio-anthropological conceptual framework of natural resource management by providing a detailed actor-centred analysis that situates agents and local power relations within their institutional and cultural context while explaining how these same micropolitics articulate with and within wider global scales.
Regional setting
Despite varying territorial distributions throughout their history, the people of the Maghreb have generally mainly concentrated in its less arid regions. Analogies between the type of natural resource use, population density, topography and rainfall patterns are particularly striking in the Maghreb. For example, the number of inhabitants per km 2 between the dry rural south and the humid rural north can range from as much as 0 to 100 (Lacoste, 1995) . The same is true for modes of natural resource exploitation, as in drier areas extensive pastoralism tends to be the norm whereas in more humid areas sedentary agropastoralists are more prevalent. Indeed, the spatial dispersal of resources (water, soil, vegetation) in the Maghreb in very large measure determines the distribution of human settlements, their density, their type of natural resource use, the way they move within ecosystems and their territorial appropriation (Floret et al., 1986) . However, the spatial distribution and ecosystem use of populations is indeed also determined by politico-historical factors. For example, the arrival of the Arabs in the 7th century AD, with their religious, military, and economic practices revolutionized the ethno-cultural map and human ecology of the Maghreb in ways never seen before. Installing themselves throughout the Maghreb, the nomadic Arabs settled especially in the great fertile plains where they maintained an itinerant lifestyle similar to that which they practiced in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. The pastoralism they employed significantly altered the landscape through the establishment of variety of rich steppe species. For example, botanical studies by Schoenenberger (1994, p. 10) , conducted in the Moroccan pre-Saharan High Atlas Draa valley over a period of 20 years, showed that one particular forage plant, Atriplex halimus, requires regular clipping or grazing to remain healthy. This pastoral form of exploitation of the plains typically involved a low population density. The indigenous Berbers, who generally practiced a form of agro-pastoralism, resisted the dominant Arab power and payment of taxes by concentrating in the mountains and difficult-to-access regions. Hence, this produced the densely populated mountain demographic distribution that can be still seen today, which sometimes reaches over 50 inhabitants per km 2 . This is the case in many areas of the different ranges of the Atlas and the Rif, and is often referred to as the "Maghrebi demographic inversion" (Lacoste, 1995) . In Morocco, the arrival of modern French and Spanish colonialism did not affect its ethnic composition as much as the Arab invasions, yet it certainly changed the relations between Arabs and Berbers and their relation to the land. In 1930 after a long colonial process which started in 1912, two new laws were imposed in the parts of Morocco officially under French rule (including the area of study presented in this article). One legal system was created for the Berber areas, mainly rural and mountainous (Berber Dahir), and one for Arab areas, which were predominantly urban or lowland (Bellaoui, 1989) . Most historians agree that one of the goals of this legislation was the division of the Moroccan population to facilitate its domination; indeed it immediately provoked violent reactions from Moroccan nationalists (Lafuente, 1999) . Following the arrival of dominant settlers in already highly populated areas, as different local informants pointed out, the High Atlas experienced further population growth due to modern medicine, improved diet, new productive methods, modern veterinary care, and economic development accentuating the pressure over local natural resources.
At the same time, colonial governors called for the intensive exploitation of arable land (often tribal collective lands) to make productive areas hitherto, in their opinion, underutilized. The peoples of these regions, usually the mountains and the surrounding areas, were subjected to the appropriation, often violent, of their land by the colonial regime or their new local collaborators, the major caids of the Atlas (Bellaoui, 1989) . At the dawn of independence, most Europeans left the Maghreb and Morocco, although a small number stayed. The land left by the colonial settlers was recovered by the state or by wealthy Moroccan landowners who never resumed the traditional methods. Particularly the more accessible plains were rarely recovered by members of the communities that were dispossessed during the establishment of the Protectorate.
The group presented in detail here, the Mesioui, make up part of these mountain Berber populations whose land and body politic were relatively closely controlled by the colonial powers through the aforementioned caids. After that, once the Moroccan postcolonial state was installed, since the Mesioui have always been considered particularly rebellious (before, during and after colonisation) towards the central government, the Makhzen, a relative marginalization of the Mesioui has been sustained until our days. The Mesioui are a 'tribal' group (tqbilt) of the High Atlas of central Morocco gravitating mainly around the Zat river basin which extends over nearly 1000 km 2 , with nearly 100,000 inhabitants.
During Dominguez' extended fieldwork he focused on a section of the tribe named the 'Mountain Mesioui'. These constitute nearly 23,000 people, made up of five tribal factions across some 80 villages with a main administrative centre at Arbaa Tighdouine.
Research was most intensively conducted among the Ait Ikis ( Fig. 1) , a sub-faction of the Mesioua tribe composed of about 700 people subsisting in a territory of approximately 20 km 2 . The Mesioui can be described as non-orthodox Sunni Muslims who maintain beliefs and religious practices resulting from a long interaction with pre-Muslim Berber cosmologies and successive waves of Arabized Islam. Today, the Mesioui continue to organize themselves around tribes, tribal sub-groups, villages, lineages and household, more-or-less according to 'segmentary' principles (Gellner, 1969, p. 36) ; although the application of the segmentary model to Moroccan tribes has been often been legitimately criticized (e. g. Kraus, 1998, p. 4) .
The Mesioui speak Tachelhit, a Berber language of Southern Morocco. Practically all men and most of the younger women speak Arabic, which they learn through television, interactions with the administration, through social and professional relationships, and in schools, which first arrived in the area around the 1980s. At the end of that same decade, Bellaoui (1989) noted that about 75 per cent of local income was derived from the agro-pastoral sector, usually combined with seasonal labour migration or work in specialized local occupations such as building and smithing. Today, livestock reared consists mainly of cows, sheep, and goats, and agriculture is mainly focused on particular types of cereals such as barley, wheat, and maize adapted to the high altitudes, as well as certain fruits and vegetables that are cultivated in the irrigated bottom floors of the lower valleys.
The territory of the Mountain Mesioui comprises forest and nonforest pasture areas. The forested areas are especially found around the villages and used in winter, particularly for sheep and goats. Local inhabitants manage some of these forests through agdal prohibitions, closing access to the forage resources in them during the summer while grass is available in the higher lands and there is no need of fuel for heating. Beyond the forest areas, other large nonforest pastoral zones exist nearby. These comprise 'intermediary pasturelands' used mainly in spring and autumn (Dominguez et al., 2012, pp. 282e284) , both through free access by a given community of users, and also by others under agdal regulations. Finally, in the highest parts of the territory of the Mountain Mesioui we find the summer pastoral agdal areas. The geographically largest and most central tribal pastoral territory is the Yagur (Fig. 1) . Herding in this territory is prohibited by an agdal imposed upon it from late winter to early summer, approximately between March and July, although this varies from year to year according mainly with the amount of annual rainfall. The aim of the agdal is to maximize grass production whose growth is most abundant at this time of the year, as well as to protect the flowering and reproductive cycle of pasture, hence assuring its continuity the following year. Nevertheless, it seems just as relevant for the Yagur users, that the agdal also aims to assure relatively equal access to this rich pasture, as they all decide together and by majority, on the rules of management of the resource. This territory lies above 2000 m around which the various tribal segments are territorially organized (Fig. 1) . The antiquity of transhumant activity in these highland pastures can be deduced by the numerous rock carvings that can be found in the region. These carvings can date back to 2500e3500 BC (Rodrigue, 1999) , coinciding with the expansion of the Sahara as dated by Lernia (2006) , which accentuated the sense of refuge of these mountain pastures. The abundant rock carvings are of herding animals, particularly bovines. These carvings, which in the Yagur number over 2000 (Horau and Ewague, 2008) , reveal the existence of ancient transhumant societies based on pastoralism which eventually came to coexist closely with agriculture, although agriculture-related rock carvings are much scarcer and appear later in the historical record indicating the older presence of transhumant pastoralism (Pascon, 1983; Bellaoui, 1989; Sellier, 2004) .
Material and methods

Dominguez conducted research over an extended stay in the Aït
Ikis community of the 'Mountain Mesioui', totalling 12 months between 2004 and 2008, and included all the agro-pastoral seasons. He stayed in the homes of various users of the agdals, particularly that of the Yagur, who through informal conversation provided data on its past and present social uses and symbolic representations. This permitted him to understand the traditional ecological knowledge and technical practices related to the agdal as well as its historical evolutions. Participation in their daily lives further allowed him to observe the reactions to new practices and perspectives concerning the agdals, introduced to the region through different developments.
Free listing was also used to identify key changes and conflicts undergone or on going. Following the initial phase, open interviews were conducted, especially on life histories, to gain understanding into the local collective memory of the past century. This aspect of the field research was undertaken at different villages around the agdal of Yagur and particularly Warzazat, the highest village of the Ait Ikis and nearest to the Yagur. When the conditions allowed it, focus groups were organized also. These were composed of no more than ten people at a time, and were generally four to six. These discussions were broad based since the nature-culture relations affected by the agdal changes cut across many social categories. Nevertheless, special groups were made according to gender and generation in order to facilitate dialogue and communication within a society highly stratified within these two domains. 
An example of governance through the tribal assembly (the JMAA)
From the lowest level of segmentation (household) to the highest (tribe), social activities and communal territory are managed through the traditional assembly, the JMAA, which is the core institution of local self-governance. The JMAA comprise all male household heads in the community, in whose absence the next oldest adult male in the family assumes this role. The JMAA was in charge and mainly still is among the Mountain Mesioui of organizing the life of the community in almost all its aspects; politically, economically, socially, morally and religiously. For example, different agdal prohibitions are enforced by persons elected by the JMAA and called to be the guardians, the Ait Rbain, who after denounce possible infractions, and the appropriate sanctions are imposed according to the severity of the transgression as decided by the JMAA.
Several factors come together to determine how a particular tribal faction or village organizes an agdal or system of agdals (with variations in dates, space limits, guards, sanctions, etc.) through its JMAA, which coordinates the movements of its different populations within the wider territory of the Mountain Mesioui. Among the factors taken into account by each deciding JMAA (a particular one is composed for each particular agdal by the direct users in each case), is the amount of pasture available to a given village, the location of the villages in relation to their pastures, the altitude of their lands, and the complementarity of these according to altitude gradient, steepness, soil types, and surface of cultivable land corresponding to each local topography. There are thus as many adaptive multi-agdal models as different groups of interest users.
Although many anthropologists writing during the colonial period (e. g. Montagne, 1930) compare the Berber communities with 'republics' and highlight the 'democratic' nature of the JMAA, it is necessary to view this in the light of more recent critical analyses (Lafuente, 1999, p. 42e53, p. 84e93; Hammoudi, 1974, p. 156) . We emphasize, based on Dominguez' observations that mediation only takes place between the leaders of households and not by individuals. Thus, women and the youth are excluded from direct representation. In addition, the most powerful men of the different communities or tribal sub-factions are also sometimes able to partially influence the JMAAs' own criteria for they always have methods of constraining some of the members of the assemblies. Nevertheless, and even if this governing body has been weakened by the presence of the state, which affects practically all contemporary tribal structures for the Mesioua tribe as for most other High Atlas groups and other tribal societies of the Maghreb, the JMAA institution is still a very active component of local governance. De facto, as described below, these JMAA continue to be largely representative and a relatively important tool for defending the interests of 'small' men and popular majorities.
To elucidate our analysis, we present a short detailed ethnographic account of a JMAA in operation, negotiating the local micropolitics of natural resource management. After the Friday prayers of August 19, 2005, a large number of men dressed in white, emerged slowly from the mosque in a cordial and peaceful manner. This apparent sense of fellowship between the faithful seemed to come from a strong nucleus of contained emotions; prayer in these cases is a ritual of relaxation and preparation for the discussion at the JMAA.
The four main topics covered on this day at the JMAA were 1. the payment that was to be made by the entire community to the forest guards in order to baksheesh them and continue to have access to firewood in the surrounding forests; 2. the payment of an azain (fine) by some members of the community to the JMAA for having graze within various areas of the community under agdal interdiction; 3. the lifting of one of the three active agdals at that time, to permit users to graze their cattle on the agdal n'udrar (agdal of the mountain) due to a particularly dry summer; and 4. the organization of a twiza party (village mutual aid) for the construction of a deposit that would provide water coming from the higher Yagur to the entire community through three fountains for the three main sub-villages. The first problem concerning the forest guards' payment was solved in about one minute flat, with all parties unanimously finding agreement. It was the second point, however, that triggered the dispute.
In august the fruit agdal at the bottom of the neighbouring valley is opened approximately one day every two weeks in order allow access to community members to remove the ripe fruit from their trees for private consumption, mostly pomegranates, grapes, figs, prickly pears and plums, and avoid thus the rotting of precious fruit. Nevertheless, during the village assembly it was demanded that each of the family heads of those having been caught infringing the fruit agdal over the previous two weeks must pay the corresponding fine for this transgression. If this was not done, the agdal on the valley floor could not be lifted. These offenses are typically reported by the agdal guardians, the Ait Rbain, specifically chosen every year in a rotational basis by the JMAA, for the monitoring of each different type of agdal. For example, a number of shepherds or cattle breeders had been chosen to watch over the pastoral agdal of the slopes of the neighbouring valley (agdal n'udrar), while several agriculturists had been selected for monitoring the fruit agdal of the neighbouring valley floor, as well as for the cereal agdal present in the community's higher and main pasture at that time in August. A small part of the fines sometimes goes to the Aït Rbain, but mainly to the JMAA for the general management of public affairs.
The household representatives of the offenders of the fruit agdal did not strongly object to the fines except for one. This individual wanted to avoid paying the 10 Dirhams that was demanded (z1 V, about 0.1% of the average annual salary). This was based, he argued, on the fact that he had organized the only festive wedding of the year for his daughter just a few days before and had invited everyone, with the celebrations lasting three days and three nights. After an increasingly tense discussion where many vehemently expressed their opinion, the man swore he never would pay the fine to demonstrate the deep ingratitude and dishonour he felt from his community fellows. In such context, swearing publically is a serious affair, particularly because one cannot after withdraw such a vow. In a spirit of resolution, another household head who was related to the resistant JMAA member, declared somewhat in extremis, that he would pay the disturbed offender's fine, and avoided further violence after almost coming to blows with other members. This catharsis seemed to have thus fulfilled its role for the offender was left with his honour more or less still intact and the JMAA received its payment, thus saving also its honour and respect necessary to continue operating the different agdals.
The third point concerned the removal or retention of the pastoral agdal which was imposed, not upon the fruit tree valley floor this time, but upon the neighbouring valley slopes, the agdal n'udrar. This proposal by a few JMAA members, three in total, was due to the poor pasture conditions in the Yagur caused by the drought of 2005's late summer, also because the expansion of cultivated land in the Yagur was increasingly limiting grazing space available. Of these, three household representatives who were in favour for the removal of the agdal n'udrar, one was the biggest cattle owner with more than 300 heads, mostly goats, and the two others were relatively large livestock breeders, with 65 and 50 heads respectively (the mean livestock size of a flock being of around 15 heads). It seems that this opening of access to the neighbouring valley's slopes specifically benefitted the goats, for this pasture consisted of steep slopes and granite substrate with thin soils that this type of animal can access better than others. This gives an example of the structure of the JMAA in relation to pressure groups. Lacking sufficient influence, in this particular case the three protagonists lost the fight against the other 80 households (directly or indirectly present), and became the butt of jokes during for weeks after. Yet only some two months earlier, the JMAA allowed foreigners to the community (from neighbouring villages) to freely browse the entire valley slopes, and even the area of the valley floor at a time where there was still no fruit ripening.
The fourth and final issue of debate of this assembly was influenced by this third point, for if these three owners or any others were allowed to graze their animals in the neighbouring valley's slopes during the active prohibition of the pastoral agdal n'udrar, the rest of the households threatened to withdraw from the collective work (twiza) for the construction of the collective water basin that had started a few days earlier, thus affecting the community at large. A number of the guardians of the agdal n'udrar (the Ait Rbain) also threatened to resign from their duty if this was allowed to happen. Hence, like a house of cards, removing the agdal n'udrar could bring down the entire group's key set of agreements. One of the final statements given by the Ait Rbain was as follows: "If Mr X does not pay the fine corresponding to his family member's violation of the neighbouring fruit valley floor agdal, and the three opposing members of the JMAA do not respect the pastoral agdal n'udrar we will not monitor both agdals anymore and we are not going to work for the water basin". The next day, everyone (men, women and children) set off at about seven in the morning to the neighbouring valley floor to pick the ripe fruit, and its agdal which prohibits the picking of fruit was restored at the end of the afternoon. At the same time, the day just after that, everyone got back together for the collective work (twiza) to build the new water basin.
Ethno-historical changes of the agdal of Yagur
As Lafuente describes (1968, p. 101), grazing conflicts have for long been frequent within Mesioui agdals, and the Yagur has always been a bone of contention between Mesioui factions, even involving other tribes from the neighbouring Ourika tribe, during which the Yagur changed ownership at least three times in the last two centuries. According to an elderly man from the Aït Ikis who remembered the stories told to him by his grandparents, the last battles in the Yagur happened during the nineteenth century:
Ghelliz, the big caid of the Ouriki tribe was present in the Yagur to receive tributes, gifts and services from the mountain Mesioui. He liked to draw up his tent camp in the centre of Yagur on the mountain pass today called Tizi n'Ghelliz (the mountain pass of Ghelliz). One day, he was waiting for the visit of two women from Ait Ikis, one from the Ait Laarbi family and the other from the Ait Abdellah family, that were to be sent to him as a gift from this community. When the two beautiful women covered by abundant jewellery approached the camp hidden in the folds of the Meltsene, upon arriving they insisted to see Ghelliz alone inside his tent. Ghelliz appreciated this offering. But the 'women' were in reality two men disguised. They had hidden sharp knives under their robes and once they entered the tent alone with Ghelliz, they stabbed him right in his heart! That's how they killed Ghelliz, and then the Mesioui attacked the Ouriki camp and they chased them to the limits of the Yagur and beyond.
Traditionally, the agdal prohibition in the Yagur was effectively legitimized and supported by long-held religious beliefs associated with the local Sufi saint, Sidi Boujmaa, and his descendants who were considered to be Sufi saints themselves (some partially are still). These saints, known generally as Murabitin or Shorfa (respectively plural of Marabut and Sherif), are considered to be descended from the Prophet himself and are still understood by many to be touched by the baraka, God's benediction. For centuries, this baraka was considered (and still is in many cases) to be disseminated to the non-saintly inhabitants of the Mesioui territory, the local majority, if they respected the stipulated rituals and showed due deference to the great saint's descendants. These male descendants of the saints formed a brotherhood and a space for Islamic teaching, reflection and divine illumination that are locally referred to as zawiyat and are often considered being as a Berber version of the Arab madrasas. This brotherhood was generally seen by local people as mediators between humans and Allah. This Sidi Boujmaa zawiya continues today, if in diminished form, to educate young Mesioui children, and to provide a space touched by Baraka for divine reflection. In the ethnographic literature, these saints and their descendants are generally identified as mystics or Sufis, and are shown to be in opposition to so-called orthodox Islam (Tozy, 1999, p. 31, p. 225) .
As influential actors in indigenous societies, during the colonial era these saintly personages were closely monitored. The colonial administration tended to marginalize those saintly families that could present a threat and favoured those who could become their allies (Mateo, 2003) . In fact, the French and Spanish governors were conscious of the fact that all the sultans of Morocco claimed saintly heritage, and it has further been demonstrated that this sanctimonious legitimation has always played a role for those seeking power in North Africa (Gellner, 1981) . The postcolonial Moroccan state emerging in the aftermath of the independence of 1956 under the rule of king Mohamed V, and particularly during the convulsed period of his son Hassan II experienced the threat of many coups d' etat. This state continued the colonial policy of maintaining alliances with friendly saintly lineages and excluding renegade saints suspected of treason. Nevertheless, even though the treatment given to the different religious brotherhoods of Morocco depended on their varying relations with the central administration, the emerging independent state, run by a newly Western educated elite, tended to view rural tribal society of which the saints were part as highly conservative, even primitive, and whose presence hindered the strategic modernising goals of the new country. In this context, during in the 1960s the politico-cultural edifice that supported and sustained the rural saints of the Mesioui began a deep transformation that was consolidated during the 1970s and 1980s.
Indeed, in the Mesioui until the 1970s, the descendants of Sidi Boujmaa announced the end of the annual agdal prohibition every year at the weekly market. This would take place on the last Wednesday before the first big Friday prayer of Smaym, the Berber summer beginning on the 28th of July. This was the means by which local users of the Yagur opened up, symbolically and materially, the richest pastoral land of the Mesioui and thereby ritually protected themselves against the djinn (malevolent spirits). Some days later at the beginning of August, the Mountain Mesioui would honour Sidi Boujmaa at his grave (which is still believed by many to be a gateway to Allah), through ritual offerings of bags of grain, butter, couscous, and cattle sacrifices that would end in a great feast and meal (maaruf). All of it was given away to the saints' descendants, who in turn would redistribute the produce with all those present. These ceremonial feasts could be attended by over a thousand people at a time, including representatives from all over the Mesioui and beyond.
Symbolically, the most important feature of the ritual was its performance in the presence of the saint and though him, Allah. As all the tribal representatives were present and shared the food and ritual experience, the whole community thus received the saintly protection (the baraka). After meticulously following the ritual and thereby demonstrating their piety, Allah thus rewarded his celebrants. After the one day ritual the attendants would walk back home confident that they had left the old year behind, and were free to enter a safe and prosperous new summer season favoured by God's will.
The ritual further performed a redistributive function. In fact, the wealthy generally gave more to the saints with the intention of purchasing a greater portion of Allah's protection as well as social honour and prestige. The saint's descendants in turn redistributed an equal quantity of produce back to all the attendees, irrespective as to who gave more. At the same time, however, the redistribution at the village of Sidi Boujmaa always seemed to slightly favour the saints' descendants, who always obtained some net material benefit from the whole ritual process. Meanwhile, beyond the personal or collective gifts that they received during the ritual, they also received numerous gifts at other times of the year, as did many other saintly lineages throughout the different Atlas ranges of Morocco and beyond, in the hope that the donors would in turn receive the saintly baraka.
One young Mesioui who emigrated to Marrakech at an early age, described the role of the maaruf as follows:
The maaruf is the one thing that brings people together to join the taqbilts [tribes or tribal factions] for if such a gathering were to be removed, all taqbilts would scatter, each taqbilt would have its own opinion without common agreement. For example, if you have five taqbilts, then they will have five different opinions. Therefore we have the maaruf in order to unite our opinions. So that's why we undertake the maaruf, to gather taqbilts and honour the dead [saints] … we honour the saints, to unite out differences. If we were to stop the maaruf, if we forget to do the maaruf, then everyone will do what he wants, opinion will be divided, and thus the people will fall apart! A change in the religious beliefs linked to the saints and thus to the different agdals can be noted among the Mesioua tribe beginning in the 1960s and 70s. During this time, influences from outside the region began to penetrate the Mesioui. Increasingly locals came into contact with Imams, new Islamist movements, civil servants and NGO activists all trained in Moroccan urban or semi-urban centres or even abroad. Further to this, international tourism, public schools, radio stations and the arrival of mass media all played a role in devaluing the local cosmologies by viewing the prestige given to saints as archaic, futile, anti-Islamic and as hindering development, thereby matching the aforementioned vision of the ruling classes. These external influences combined to effectively displace the saints' central position within the local cosmology and thus their role in the management of traditional agropastoral systems, including agdals, was greatly diminished.
Research conducted up to 2010 (Dominguez et al., 2010, p. 358 ) confirmed that a change in the effectiveness of the agdal prohibition was directly linked to this diminishment of belief in the saints' baraka and protection. The degree to which the belief was still maintained varied according to age, gender, and socio-economic status. In this study, a sociocultural statistical analysis revealed that individuals who reported less attachment to traditional beliefs regarding local saints also tended to prefer newer practices of pasture management, and these were undertaken most commonly by the wealthier members of society. These methods entailed rearing a new variety of sheep, the Sardi, which has resulted in the acceleration of agricultural expansion over the traditionally pastured lands, and biological degradation due to monoculture practices. Furthermore, Dominguez et al. found that the portion of the population defined as more 'traditionalist' were on average 58.1 years old while the population we defined as less 'traditionalist' were on average 43.2 years old, revealing a significant difference between the generations. Nevertheless, we concur that the survey contained biases due the fact that it was conducted mainly among male household heads. In fact, according to Mahdi (1999) , Pellicer (2008) and Dominguez (2010) , it is the female portion of the population that retain the greatest belief in the saints. Today, the role of women in the transmission and maintenance of these older beliefs is the most important, as they are now the main conduits of these systems of cultural representation. At the level of observed practice, it is also women who mostly continue to offer rituals and offerings to the saints, perhaps accompanied by their sons, daughters, grandsons and granddaughters.
Overall therefore, the agdal prohibitions in the Yagur territory have lost much of their religious content over the past five decades, which in any case link up with the previously described sociosymbolical transformations. Even where people still maintain beliefs regarding the agdal, they are less powerful that they were 50 years ago. At the same time, some still believe in divine punishment if agdal prohibitions are broken, although this is now usually attributed to Allah alone, without intermediation of the saints and associated spirits. For example, during an interview with a shepherd about the saints near the summit of the Metlsen, the highest peak of the Mesioua tribe, he described a significant reorientation of cultural references regarding the agdal whereby the mediating position of the saints between Allah and the people has now largely disappeared; indeed, much of local society today joke about the power of the old saints, even denouncing the such beliefs as 'illegal' or the saints as 'thieves'.
Importantly, the great majority no longer believe that the annual deactivation of the agdal has to be announced by the saint's descendants in order to receive their blessing. Thus, since the 1980s, the Yagur has opened to grazing much earlier than the date traditionally announced by the saints, sometimes by up to a month and a half, and this has come to depend solely on the authorization of the Yagur users' JMAA . Moreover, today it is more usually the local government-appointed official, the caid, who ultimately decides and announces the opening date. The resolution of such conflict is hindered without the presence of the saints as customary peace-making 'functionaries'. Indeed, since the saint sanctioned rule of the agdal was broken and the first big Friday prayer of Smaym around the 28th of July was abolished as opening date for the Yagur, violent altercations within the tribal JMAA appear to have increased, thereby enhancing the apparent legitimacy of the central authorities who perceive their own presence as vital for maintaining order and control. Thus, today the caid has supplanted the old role of the saints as arbitrators of local conflict. At the same time, some local farmers see in the new role of the caid a greater opportunity to negotiate a more convenient (earlier) opening date of the agdal, and some claim this is often in exchange for personal favours and again baksheesh.
A shepherd of Ait Ourir made the following statement in front of the camera (Dominguez, 2008) , revealing a common contemporary attitude toward the saints:
At that time [up to the 1970s] it was the descendants of Sidi Boujmaa, who announced the opening of the Yagur. But this is no longer the case, now is the tribe that dictates the opening. Previously, at the market the saints of Sidi Boujmaa would announce the opening of the Yagur, stating, "those wishing to transhume up to the Yagur may do so for it will now be open!" Until the 1960s and 70s it was they who opened it. But now with the advent of things like the bearded [sic] who consider all this as bidaa (un-Islamic), there are no more Murabitin nor people who act as officiates of the saintly rites. The families of the saints themselves resigned from the case.
The patron saint of the agdal no longer receives the collective honour and favour from all Mountain Mesioui villages as it used to be before. Today, only a small number pay collective tribute to Sidi Boujmaa in August and mainly only those belonging to the Ait Wagoustite faction within whose territory the village of Sidi Boujmaa remains. Moreover, this is generally not organized in the different village councils but during individual attendances. Today much of the pastureland that received the saints' protection has been turned into agricultural fields, just as the Sidi Boujmaa clan has become displaced in the local social hierarchy and cosmology. Nevertheless, as we will see below, this shift was not produced uniquely by the imposition of one ontological framework over the other, but also through the action and participation of local actors, each driven by personal interest and development opportunities.
Agro-economic drift of the agdal of Yagur
In this section, we shift the analysis to the agro-economic changes experienced in the Yagur over the past 100 years, especially during the last five decades. The data provided here comes from Dominguez' conversations with various members of the communities using the Yagur, and most particularly a few key informants from Aït Ikis, who explained in situ, the position, timing, and extent of different surfaces cultivated by farming lineages in the Yagur of the Ait Ikis over last 100 years. At the same time, to avoid dependence on just a few informants, we compared this information with data from members belonging to other communities using the Yagur. Through several surveys alongside participant observation, we managed to form a picture of the area of cultivated land in the Yagur through time.
In this manner we learned that while the socio-cultural and religious changes mentioned above started to occur in the 1960s through to the 80s, the Moroccan government developed national plans to improve the genetic stock of sheep kept by pastoralists. A new breed, the above mentioned Sardi sheep, was introduced and local herders incorporated it gradually into their own flocks, with the result that today the majority of sheep in the Yagur have been crossed with the Sardi and can be considered as mainly consisting of this breed. Compared to the older local variety (the Beldi), the Sardi is less suited to rangeland grazing and thus spends more time in pens, consumes more grain, but is more productive if well fed. Indeed, when the Sardi's diet is well supplemented with a grain diet, mainly barley, it can achieve nearly double the size of a traditional Beldi within a year (Bourbouze, 1981) . Moreover, not only did the state facilitate the introduction of the Sardi, it simultaneously subsidized grain production in the Great Plains of Morocco which in great measure feed the Sardi today.
Adoption of the new breed significantly changed the composition of the herds belonging to most people of the High Atlas, and the Mountain Mesioui were part of this shift. Through the use of new agricultural techniques (e.g. increased cereal production and the alimentary complementation of animals, the mechanization of harvesting, and the use of new fertilizers for the production of the grain to feed the new Sardi breed), the proportion of sheep increased significantly between 1960 to the present as compared with other locally raised animals (goats, cows, and mules). Also, the expansion of barley fields on the Yagur for the Sardi's fodder has been greatly facilitated by a recent influx of small threshing machines imported from Turkey at very low prices. Simultaneously, demand for red meat in the neighbouring Marrakech by the growing tourist economy (promoted ceaselessly by the Moroccan authorities), further encourages people to raise the more productive Sardi sheep, exacerbating the transformation to intensive livestock farming in the Yagur.
A major factor that affected local practices came in the form of economic migration, which largely enabled individuals to participate in the changes mentioned above. From the 1960s onwards individual Mountain Mesioui from all socio-economic classes began to emigrate internationally for work, mainly to the coalmines of northern France. This migration was usually temporary, and while some stayed in France for decades, many came back after just a few years. The returning migrant labourers reinvested their accumulated capital in new agro-pastoral activities and soon became the new local elite. They invested especially in new Sardi sheep and expanded private cereal cultivation inside the once communally-owned lands of the eastern regions of the Yagur. Using their savings, this new elite were able to effect over time the transformation of land use and land property patterns of the area by investing in local manpower to plough large extensions of land on the only remaining site accessible for agriculture, the Yagur's flat highlands.
After expanding monoculture of wheat and barley and losing much of the highly biodiverse pastures typical for these areas (Alaoui et al., 2009) , the local elite were followed in the 1980s by most of the remaining local agro-pastoralists in this activity; particularly within the middle income classes who were in a better position to invest the little they had in the new Sardi sheep, and in the ploughing of new land that would feed them. These individuals were unable to migrate to France due to new restrictions but were soon able to participate in the new land use exploitation practices begun by the former migrants (Demay, 2004, p. 28) . These agropastoralists derived their income mainly from the local sale of their produce and from seasonal labour migration within Morocco, a pattern that became increasingly standard from the 1980s onwards. In fact, income from seasonal labour migration slowly became an extended practice and today many households are fully reliant upon it. This is because land resources have become increasingly scarce following population growth, which we hypothesize to be attributed mainly to the introduction of modern medicine, but also changes in alimentary provision and increase in living standards in general. In some cases, human populations have even tripled, as with some groups using the Yagur (Bouchtia, 2004) . Today, as Morocco's economy increasingly globalizes, remittances from migrant labour can comprise between 25% and 75% of household income (Dominguez, 2010) . This has finally permitted many households at the lowest socio-economic rung to accumulate enough capital to emulate the rest of the community in the expanding agriculture on the Yagur and new forms of agricultural practice, thus completing the agricultural transition that began about fifty years previously.
However, the transformation of land usage throughout the Yagur from pastoralism to intensive agriculture did not occur without resistance. Indeed, the practices gave rise to frequent conflict in the local assemblies between opponents and supporters of agricultural expansion in the Yagur. On one hand, many of the supporters of the saintly traditions also explicitly supported the conservation of the pastures challenged these new transformations to the ancient pastoral lands, while at same time the partisans pushing for agricultural expansion, mainly those former migrants and the higher classes, tended to diminish the importance of the saints based 'collective' philosophy that blocked their 'individual' agricultural projects. Meanwhile, the lower socio-economic classes saw in the appropriation of collective land by the elite a sort of land grabbing of their own common resource. But even if these clashes were very tense and continued over decades as the community as a whole was reformulating itself, in the end, the JMAA was unable to curb this agricultural expansion. In fact, there was never any clear majority to impose a long-term resistance to agricultural expansion in the Yagur, since in the end practically everyone benefitted in one way or another from it, either through investment of labour on their own behalf (elite and middle income groups), or by receiving wages as hired agricultural workers (the middle and lower income groups). This is not to suggest that all have benefitted equally, for with their subsistence base removed, the only choice for the poorer classes was to work for the new elite. Indeed, during this time, the elite consolidated its influence in the JMAA, through which they were able to lean on the many poorer farmers, who often owed favours and debts to the former, thereby extending the influence their vote and thus furthering the agricultural transformation of the Yagur.
Results obtained in 2006 showed that the mainly mono-specific wheat and barley cultivated surface area of Asagul (the main agricultural site of eastern Yagur) had more than doubled from the 15 ha estimated in 1960 to the more than 34 ha estimated in 2006 by one of Dominguez's key informants. We cannot give the name of this key informant as well as that of any other, for respect and anonymity for our confidents. Nevertheless, we can say that this is a local middle-aged agro-pastoralist at the time of the survey (2006) and a full member of the community cultivating the Yagur. Hence, this illustrates the acceleration of agricultural expansion, to the detriment of highly biodiverse pastures. In turn, such agricultural growth encouraged people to maintain a semi-sedentary way of life on the land outside but immediately neighbouring the Yagur agdal. This not only facilitated further agriculture expansion over prime pastoral areas within the Yagur, but also increased local disregard for the agdal prohibition, since control over free-riders among the partially sedentarized populations on the edges of the Yagur became more difficult to assure, particularly by others having their main habitat further away as the Ait Wagoustite or the other Ait Zat.
Discussion
Firstly, the brief historical ethnography presented in this article reveals the particular case of the Mesioui agdals of the High Atlas of Marrakech and especially of the agdal of Yagur to be highly dynamic over time. While several authors (Simoneau, 1967; Rodrigue, 1999; Sellier, 2004) have discussed rock carvings and how these highlighted historical changes of how the Yagur's use shifted over several millennia, Gellner (1969) and Ilahiane (1999) have pointed to changes in the local cosmology involving the instauration during the middle-ages of Muslim saint worship which facilitated the regulation of pastoral collective property in the High Atlas mountains. In the meantime Lafuente (1968) contributed by illustrating the shifts in how the territory of the Yagur was divided between factions over the last two centuries. We have added to this historical sequence of socio-ecological transformations that was missing in scholarly historiography, by describing through ethnographic examples and discussion how such changes have continued over the last five decades. Our work thus emphasises and reinforces the idea that dynamism and historicity applies also to small-scale socio-ecologic systems.
Secondly, as we explained in the introductory section, the main cause for failures of many previously sustainable ICCAs worldwide has often been given as 'external' forces such as globalisation and the market. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the current local governance regime in charge of the Mesioui agdals and particularly the Yagur's, has a long history of interaction with the wider world, ensuing the transformation of the previous mobile, communitarian, pastoralist socio-ecosystem into a predominantly sedentary, privatized, agricultural one. The literature that analyses the decline of the agdals gives central importance to the colonial and postcolonial detribalization process that took place during the 20th century as the primary destabilizing force (Gellner, 1969, p. 19e21; Kraus, 1998, p. 7) and the Moroccan case is not exceptional in this respect (Auclair and AlIfriqui, 2005, p. 69) .
In fact, it would be accurate to consider that the tribal sociocosmological system prior to colonization or state intervention was integral to the agdal decision-making in which saint worship played a fundamental role. Indeed, the saints were crucial in determining the opening of the agdals, and acted to prevent powerful users from achieving unequal access to resources through symbolic as well as embodied regulatory intervention. A unity of vision, reinforced during the maaruf further reinforced this position. Hence, this process of subjugating local institutions in order to better control indigenous populations (Davis, 2005, p. 212) resulted in empting agdals, zawiyas and the JMAA of much of their power and meaning. This process was maintained and reinforced throughout the postcolonial era by the newly independent state, which generally viewed tribalism and Marabutism as an anachronism, as both primitive but also a political threat due the capacity of the tribes and Marabuts to organise resistance. Hence, they pushed for their development through their integration within the growing national economy and political system. In the same manner, the agro-technological advances such as the development of the Sardi sheep breed contributed to transforming traditional use of the high agdal pastures, just like the national subsidization of wheat for human consumption enabled highland pastoralists to concentrate most of their agricultural efforts towards growing low quality cereal for Sardi feeding. Furthermore, the state's marginalization of the old regime including tribal assemblies, the agdal and the religious veneration of the saints, was compounded by the arrival of public services, administrators, radio, obligatory state schooling, the market economy, and later other forms of globalization, such as mass media, internet, NGOs, tourism, and the rise of a more orthodox Islam in the Maghreb countries, also linked to a global Salafism, which is intolerant towards the saints tradition.
Nevertheless, as we have demonstrated in this paper, the changes to the Mesioui human ecosystem of the agdals and most particularly of the Yagur, have come not just from without, in the form of relatively homogenous global processes such as market forces, global culture and the hegemony of the state (Chuluun and Ojima, 2011; Benmoussa, 2013) , but also from within, revealing the agency of local actors playing out local power struggles, while entailing multiple interactions between the local and global scales. This was precisely what was illustrated in the Messioui case, which showed how external religious influences undermined local saint worship as illegitimate, for without the saints' presence to regulate users and mediate conflict, local tensions increased, at the same time as they served the local indigenous economic interests of particular parties. Hence, the reformulation of the local cosmology, to which certain local actors also proactively contributed to further their interests, along with other broader forces of cultural globalization (education, media, migration), and the adoption of new agronomic technologies, have all been key drivers behind the decline of the old agdal pastoral system.
Thirdly and finally, this study contributes more broadly to the social anthropological theoretical framework and literature by approaching in its own particular manner how the micropolitics of local natural resource management is generated. This was achieved by providing a detailed actor-centred analysis situated within its institutional and cultural context through which global processes of change have been locally viewed and understood. From this study of Moroccan Atlas agro-ecosystems, we posit that this type of cultural system entails rules and structures that have developed socially over time, but also agential individual processes that contribute to determine frames of reference for action (Alexander, 1992) . This is not to claim that individual personal interest is necessarily beneficial for the group, but that the different individuals contribute to a global social transformation through different individual strategies according to their social status, and hence reconfigurating collective livelihoods in the way Benessaiah (2015) reconceptualizes ecological management theory.
Ecological anthropology has typically been criticized for overlooking individual decision-making, and favouring actor-based models that do not incorporate holism or systemic relationships (Acosta and Dominguez 2014) . Nevertheless, this structure-agent tension can be resolved if we consider that Bourdieu's concept of the habitus was not merely a theory of social reproduction. In fact, Bourdieu (1980) also provides a theory of social transformation. The comportments of one's habitus may be conceptualised as being "issued forth and added in layers by the social world over time" (Holmes, 2013, p. 184) . As Holmes (Holmes, 2013) continues, thus one's habitus can change over time if one's position in a particular social world changes. This means that if one's habitus has grown within a particular social field or position within the agdal of Yagur for example, if one's field or position changes, transformation will occur through this discordance.
The experiences of emigration by certain Messioui, we argue, served to change their habitus through symbolic and pragmatic means, and upon returning with new social and financial capital, these individuals used their capital to transform local praxis. This has a knock-on effect, whereby the practice was emulated by others, resulting in the total transformation of agropastoral livelihoods in the Yagur, with a new elite, and completely altered land use practices governed by private rather than communal ownership. Regulation and governance had now shifted from the JMAA and the saints, to the JMAA and the state, which has provided more favourable conditions for 'big men' who may gain favours through the caid. Thus, the emulation of the success of others is an important element to understanding the establishment of behavioural patterns that link up individual decision-making to framing choice with a wider social milieu. In the Yagur, the habitus of the lower classes has not changed as much as they have not achieved significant social mobility, but they have managed to adapt it to the changes overall and their own condition within it. In summary therefore, it is not only contingency or pre-established structures that explain the collective organisation in the relation to the environment, but both, 1. the pre-established or new structures and 2. actors' decisions situated within their ecological and sociocultural contexts that explains the dialectic of socioecological change.
Conclusion
Numerous authors approaching the subject from various disciplinary backgrounds have underlined the importance of ICCAs in order to assure the livelihoods of local populations whilst conserving the environment. For example, Ostrom (1990) and Berkes (1999) among others, have shown how such communal systems encourage a relatively egalitarian access to natural resources while augmenting the capacity of socio-ecological systems to adapt to changing conditions. In support of this, BorriniFeyerabend (2010) have asserted that ICCAs are central to ensuring the well-being of millions of people and the conservation of about one third of the global terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and despite this, ICCAs continue to be strongly undermined worldwide (2010: 8e9). Our analysis of the Mesioui agdals and the agdal of Yagour support this claim with new data, at the same time as our analysis gives a concrete and nuanced explanation of some of the ways through which the decline of ICCAs take place. By doing so, we have also called the attention upon the need for local populations, regional-national institutions and international agencies to take full consciousness of the ways this degradation of traditional ecosystems takes place, in order to face such situation and support these ICCAs more actively for their relation to social equity and capacity for environmental conservation.
At the same time, as we have sought to show in this paper, the study of social action from the perspective of the actor is essential to understanding how global processes are navigated through everyday praxis, which anthropological analyses are well suited to do. Studies which lean toward the perspective of the homo economicus model, of humans as motivated primarily by individual self-interest are often explained by representing individuals as interpreting all social events in terms of risk/benefit analyses and subsequently calculating their responses in relation to this (Van den Bergh et al., 2003) . More holistically-oriented social scientists, however, may view social interactions differently, whereby changes in small societies are negotiated through their own cosmological understandings, which often favour the continuity and regeneration of ecological knowledge and management strategies, and indeed society as a whole as governed by tradition and cultural heritage (Descola, 1986) . In contrast to both approaches, in the present paper we have argued for a relatively intermediate position, one that emphasises a dynamic rather than static interpretation of Bourdieu's 'habitus', in order to better understand the structural and multi-agentive transformations of traditional socioecological systems.
